BB84 Protocol
The first quantum key distribution protocol, using single photons in two conjugate bases.
BB84 is the original QKD protocol, proposed by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984. It remains the most widely implemented QKD scheme.
The Setup
Alice wants to share a secret key with Bob. Eve (eavesdropper) may try to intercept.
The Two Bases
| Basis | States | Bit Values |
|---|---|---|
| Rectilinear (+) | , | 0, 1 |
| Diagonal (×) | , | 0, 1 |
Key insight: Measuring in the wrong basis gives random results.
The Protocol
Step 1: Quantum Transmission
Alice, for each bit:
- Randomly chooses basis (+ or ×)
- Randomly chooses bit value (0 or 1)
- Sends corresponding photon to Bob
Bob, for each received photon:
- Randomly chooses basis (+ or ×)
- Measures and records result
Step 2: Sifting (Basis Reconciliation)
Over public channel:
- Alice and Bob announce their bases (not results!)
- Keep only bits where bases matched
- Discard the rest (~50% of bits)
Step 3: Error Estimation
- Randomly select and compare some key bits (publicly)
- Calculate error rate
- If error rate > threshold: abort (eavesdropper detected!)
Step 4: Post-Processing
- Error correction: Fix remaining errors
- Privacy amplification: Shrink key to remove Eve’s information
Why It’s Secure
If Eve Intercepts and Resends
Eve doesn’t know Alice’s basis. She must guess:
- Guess correctly (50%): No disturbance
- Guess wrong (50%): Introduces 25% error in that bit
Overall: Eve’s interception causes ~25% error rate in intercepted bits.
Detection
If Alice and Bob see error rate > 11% (theoretical threshold), they know Eve was present and abort.
Example
Alice's bits: 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
Alice's bases: + × + × × + × +
States sent: |1⟩ |+⟩ |1⟩ |-⟩ |+⟩ |0⟩ |-⟩ |0⟩
Bob's bases: × × + + × + × ×
Bob's results: ? 0 1 ? 0 0 1 ?
Matching bases: ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Sifted key: 0 1 0 0 1
Bob’s “?” indicates random result (wrong basis).
Practical Implementations
Photon Sources
- Weak coherent pulses (attenuated laser)
- Single-photon sources (better but harder)
- Decoy states (detect photon-number attacks)
Challenges
- Photon loss over distance
- Detector dark counts
- Timing synchronization
- Side-channel attacks
Variants
| Protocol | Improvement |
|---|---|
| Decoy-state BB84 | Defeats photon-number splitting attacks |
| BBM92 | Entanglement-based version |
| SARG04 | Better for weak coherent pulses |
See also: Quantum Key Distribution, E91 Protocol, No-Cloning Theorem, Wiesner State