Quantum Key Distribution
Using quantum mechanics to establish secure cryptographic keys between two parties, with security guaranteed by physics.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables two parties (traditionally Alice and Bob) to generate a shared secret key with security guaranteed by the laws of quantum physics, not computational assumptions.
The Goal
Create a shared random key that:
- Only Alice and Bob know
- Any eavesdropping attempt is detectable
- Security doesn’t depend on computational hardness
Why Quantum?
Classical key exchange (like Diffie-Hellman) relies on mathematical problems being hard to solve. A powerful enough computer (or algorithm) could break it.
QKD security comes from physics:
- No-cloning theorem: Can’t copy unknown quantum states
- Measurement disturbance: Observing qubits changes them
- Bell inequality violations: Certify genuine quantum correlations
Major Protocols
BB84
The original QKD protocol (1984):
- Uses single photons in two bases
- Detect eavesdropping via error rate
E91
Entanglement-based (1991):
- Uses entangled photon pairs
- Security from Bell inequality violations
Continuous-Variable QKD
Uses coherent states and homodyne detection:
- Compatible with telecom infrastructure
- Different noise analysis
Basic QKD Steps
1. QUANTUM TRANSMISSION
Alice sends quantum states to Bob
(photons encoding bits)
2. BASIS RECONCILIATION
Alice & Bob compare measurement bases (publicly)
Keep only matching-basis results
3. ERROR ESTIMATION
Compare subset of key bits (publicly)
High error rate → eavesdropper detected
4. ERROR CORRECTION
Fix remaining errors in the key
5. PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
Shrink key to remove eavesdropper's information
Result: Shorter but perfectly secure key
Security
Information-Theoretic Security
QKD can provide unconditional security: secure against any attack, even with unlimited computing power.
Assumptions Still Required
- Quantum mechanics is correct
- Devices work as specified
- No side channels
Device-Independent QKD
Device-independent QKD removes device assumptions using Bell inequality violations. Security is certified by observed quantum correlations.
Practical Considerations
| Challenge | Current State |
|---|---|
| Distance | ~100 km fiber, 1000+ km satellite |
| Key rate | ~Mbps (short distance), ~kbps (long distance) |
| Integration | Commercial systems available |
| Cost | Still expensive, specialized equipment |
Quantum Networks
For multiple users, QKD networks are being developed:
- Trusted node networks (relay through secure stations)
- Quantum repeaters (future: extend range without trust)
- Satellite QKD (demonstrated by China’s Micius)
Relation to Post-Quantum Cryptography
| Approach | Security Basis | Protects |
|---|---|---|
| QKD | Physics | Key exchange |
| Post-Quantum | Mathematical hardness | All cryptography |
Both are responses to quantum computing threats but work differently.
See also: BB84 Protocol, E91 Protocol, No-Cloning Theorem, Post-Quantum Cryptography, Quantum Random Number Generator, Device-Independent Security